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Big Data, epistemology and causality:




Recently, it has been argued that the use of Big Data transforms the sciences, making data-driven research possible and
studying causality redundant. In this paper, I focus on the claim on causal knowledge by examining the Big Data project
EXPOsOMICS, whose research is funded by the European Commission and considered capable of improving our
understanding of the relation between exposure and disease. While EXPOsOMICS may seem the perfect exemplification
of the data-driven view, I show how causal knowledge is necessary for the project, both as a source for handling
complexity and as an output for meeting the project’s goals. Consequently, I argue that data-driven claims about causality
are fundamentally flawed and causal knowledge should be considered a necessary aspect of Big Data science. In addition,
I present the consequences of this result on other data-driven claims, concerning the role of theoretical considerations.
I argue that the importance of causal knowledge and other kinds of theoretical engagement in EXPOsOMICS undermine
theory-free accounts and suggest alternative ways of framing science based on Big Data.
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Introduction
Big Data is increasingly used in diﬀerent areas of human
activity, with an arguably signiﬁcant impact on our soci-
ety. If one looks at discussions regarding Big Data, its
value is often presented in terms of the abundance of
correlations and the consequent possibility of data-
driven research, without strong theoretical consider-
ations and causal knowledge (Mayer-Scho¨nberger and
Cukier, 2013; Anderson, 2008). Recently, however, a
number of scholars have raised questions about these
claims, by highlighting the diﬃcult and complicated
tasks needed for the use of Big Data in the sciences
(Leonelli, 2014a), the technical impossibility of many
data-driven claims (Kitchin, 2014b) and the role of
hypotheses in research based on Big Data (Ratti, 2015).
In this article, I assess data-driven claims on causal
knowledge by focusing on the research of
EXPOsOMICS. EXPOsOMICS is a current biomedical
project, where Big Data is used to study the associ-
ations between exposure and disease (Wild, 2012).
The project has many features which make it a very
interesting case study, including its novel, multidis-
ciplinary and methodologically aware nature (Illari
and Russo, 2013: 175). EXPOsOMICS is a particularly
relevant case to look at from the perspective of the
data-driven view, as the use of Big Data, the focus on
associations and the absence of a strong theory of dis-
ease causation (Illari and Russo, 2013: 177) may make
it look like the perfect exempliﬁcation of the view. In
the article, nevertheless, I argue that causal knowledge
plays a crucial role in EXPOsOMICS, as one of the key
sources and outputs of the project.
Methodologically, this paper is the result of case study
research based on diﬀerent sources. In order to concretise
and clarify the argument, I use the studies published by
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scientists as part of their research and concerning speciﬁc
exposure and disease associations. Moreover, the atten-
tion to methodology and the signiﬁcant number of art-
icles researchers dedicate to the discussion of how they
work with Big Data, correlations and causality have
allowed me to study closely the methodological choices
of the project. Another signiﬁcant source for the argu-
ment of the paper is the interview I carried out with the
Principal Investigator of EXPOsOMICS, Professor
Paolo Vineis (see Supplementary material), who gave
me key insights about Big Data research in epidemiology,
the curation activities of the project and its approach
towards the issues of correlations and causality.
Finally, the work on these sources on EXPOsOMICS
was carried out on the basis of the current debate in
critical data studies, developed in diﬀerent disciplines
including philosophy, sociology, computer science, etc.
The article is structured as follows. In the ﬁrst section
I present EXPOsOMICS, highlighting the features
which make it novel and challenging biomedical research
and suggesting that it should be seen as a Big Data pro-
ject according to a broad and multi-featured deﬁnition
of Big Data. Next, I directly engage with data-driven
claims about causal knowledge. In the second section,
I describe how researchers have developed a speciﬁc
methodology for working with Big Data and I argue
that this is a way of studying disease causation. I show
that researchers’ engagement with causality is a conse-
quence of two distinct kinds of complexity, one aﬀecting
large datasets and the other the target systems examined
in the project. In the third section, I argue that the use of
Big Data in EXPOsOMICS is substantially based on
various sources of knowledge and cannot be reduced
to a mechanical ‘extraction’ of causality from the data.
In the fourth section, I show how causal knowledge is
not only important as an input for Big Data research: it
is equally crucial as an output to try to meet the goals of
the project. Hence, I conclude that EXPOsOMICS
shows how causal knowledge is a necessary element of
Big Data research and data-driven claims regarding
causality are ﬂawed. Finally, in light of the results on
causal knowledge, in the ﬁfth section of the paper I con-
sider the theory-free claim of the data-driven view;
I argue that this is in contrast with the role of theoretical
considerations in crucial stages of EXPOsOMICS. In the
conclusion, I present new questions coming up from the
results of the article, especially concerning their validity
in other Big Data projects.
EXPOsOMICS and the
Big Data literature
EXPOSOMICS is a current biomedical collaborative
project, structured as a consortium of 13 research
centres in Europe and the US and coordinated
by the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics
of Imperial College London. At the end of 2012,
the European Commission funded the project with
a budget of E8.7 million. The group of researchers
is highly interdisciplinary (Illari and Russo, 2013:
175), comprising experts in epidemiology, biology, bio-
informatics, statistics, information and communication
technologies, public health and risk assessment.
EXPOSOMICS studies the associations between expos-
ure and disease in order to assess the levels of disease
risk connected with elements and features of the envir-
onment. The project has many innovative and interest-
ing features. The ﬁrst one I would like to highlight
regards the new concept of exposure researchers have
developed. Usually, we think of exposure as exposure
to external factors; this is reﬂected in traditional epi-
demiology, which looks at exposure to environmental
factors in order to account for disease. On the other
hand, more recently genomics has developed a way of
explaining disease relying on an internalist perspective,
by focusing on the genetic features of the organism
and using ‘omics’ technologies (which collect data
about genes, mRNA, proteins and metabolites),
EXPOsOMICS aims at ﬁlling in the gaps between
these two approaches: since many diseases ‘develop pre-
dominantly from a combination of environmental
exposures played out on a particular genetic back-
ground’ (Wild, 2012: 24), their explanation cannot be
reduced to either environmental factors or internal
genetic features. Consequently, researchers in
EXPOsOMICS have developed a new concept, the
‘exposome’ (Wild, 2005), which is the total sum of
exposures aﬀecting individuals during their lifetime
and comprises what is called ‘internal’ and ‘external’
exposures. That is, when for instance trying to explain
how chlorination by-products in water may lead to
bladder cancer (Vineis and Chadeau-Hyam, 2011:
101), researchers studied both contamination due to
the by-products (external exposure) and consequent
responses in the body (internal exposure). Another
example is breast and colon cancer, for which
Chadeau-Hyam et al. (2011) investigated both the diet
and lifestyle of patients and the metabolic responses to
them. Through this ‘global’ approach to exposure, sci-
entists intend to develop more accurate evaluations of
environmental factors and identify crucial stages of dis-
ease evolution (Illari and Russo, 2013: 175). Practically,
the study of the exposome is carried out through the
search for what scientists call ‘biomarkers’. These are
biological markers, i.e. elements or features of the
environment and the organism which can be measured
and indicate biological processes (think of e.g. proteins
or metabolites). In particular, scientists try to ﬁnd asso-
ciations between biomarkers of exposure and bio-
markers of disease, thus following the path of disease
2 Big Data & Society
by guest on September 23, 2016Downloaded from 
right from exposure and tracking its initial steps. These
conceptual novelties make EXPOsOMICS a case of
‘frontier research’ (Illari and Russo, 2013: 175) in the
realm of epidemiology. Yet, these are not the only
innovations of the project. Another novel aspect
regards the fact that scientists retrieve or collect
Big Data as sources for their study of biomarkers. In
particular, among the main sources of the project are
large cohort studies, which collect data about thou-
sands of patients for a number of years. Researchers
are creating new cohorts, but they also rely on existing
databases (e.g. the European Prospective Investigation
into Cancer and Nutrition). In addition, scientists often
use databases that focus on particular chemicals or bio-
logical samples (e.g. the Humane Metabolome
Database). The data used in the project is usually pro-
duced by high-throughput technologies: for internal
exposure, omics clearly stands out as the most used
kind of technology (Vineis et al., 2009); for external
exposure, researchers rely on a variety of technologies,
including sensors, geo-referencing, satellites, smart-
phones, etc. (Wild, 2012: 26). The use of Big Data
brings about both exciting possibilities and challenges,
which concern how to process, analyse and handle dif-
ferent datasets and consequently require experts in stat-
istics, bioinformatics and information and
communication technologies. In addition to these, the
interdisciplinary group of researchers in
EXPOsOMICS also comprises experts in public
health, policy and risk assessment. This allows me to
introduce another key feature of this innovative pro-
ject. We have seen that, through the research on the
exposome, scientists intend to follow the development
of diseases at diﬀerent stages. This is where the role of
the aforementioned policy experts comes in, since pre-
dictions and knowledge about disease evolution are
used to inform policy. For instance, as a consequence
of the study of chlorination by-products in water and
their eﬀects on bladder cancer, researchers may be able
to determine acceptable and risk levels of chlorine in
water. That is, the innovative theoretical and methodo-
logical elements of EXPOsOMICS research are
considered capable of having a signiﬁcant impact on
issues of primary importance, like risk assessment and
public health.
I have highlighted that the use of Big Data is one of
the innovative aspects of EXPOsOMICS research. But
what is Big Data and why can EXPOsOMICS be
deﬁned a Big Data project? On the face of it, deﬁning
Big Data looks trivial: Big Data seems to simply refer
to the fact that we now have technologies capable of
collecting, storing and processing ‘big’ datasets; on this
view, EXPOsOMICS would be a Big Data project inso-
far as its researchers work with large amounts of data.
However, as highlighted in the discussions and
literature on Big Data, the deﬁnition is less straightfor-
ward. In oﬃcial documents like those of the Intellectual
Property Oﬃce (2014) and the Parliamentary Oﬃce of
Science and Technology (2014), three elements are used
to deﬁne Big Data: volume, velocity and variety, which
are known as the ‘three Vs’. According to the three Vs
deﬁnition, Big Data surely is the result of the great
volume of data collected, but also of the high velocity
with which data is collected (in terms of accumulation
and event rates) and the large variety of the data itself
(in terms of the variety of sources and data structure).
The idea that Big Data is simply Big Data seems even
more problematic if we consider that the three Vs def-
inition has been criticised in the literature. The philoso-
pher Floridi (2012: 435–436) highlights the relational
nature of the three categories, arguing that relationality
requires more speciﬁcity and hence other categories.
In recent years, several other categories and conse-
quently broader deﬁnitions of Big Data have been
proposed in the social sciences literature (see Kitchin
and MacArdle, 2016: 1–2). On the basis of a review of
these deﬁnitions, Kitchin (2013: 262–263, 2014a: 27–28)
focuses on the categories making Big Data qualitatively
diﬀerent from small data. In addition to the three Vs,
features which are unique to Big Data include the pos-
sibility of conjoining diﬀerent types of data, the strong
detail and resolution allowing for unique identiﬁca-
tions, the ability of focusing on entire populations
and the high scalability of data production. Such a
broader deﬁnition of Big Data, taking into account
many diﬀerent aspects, is the most suited to describing
EXPOsOMICS. Indeed, while researchers in the project
certainly beneﬁt from the volume, velocity and variety
of the datasets they work with, they need the high level
of resolution allowing them to study exposure at
both the external and internal levels. Moreover, we
have also seen that researchers work with a variety
of technologies and sources and, from this perspective,
the possibility of conjoining diﬀerent types of datasets
is another key feature. Therefore, I would argue that
EXPOsOMICS is a Big Data project in the sense sug-
gested by Kitchin’s broad deﬁnition of Big Data, which
is the one I shall stick to throughout the paper.
In the literature on Big Data, discussions do not
simply concern its deﬁnition but also what we can do
with it; this is where the epistemological questions come
in. In general, Big Data is often considered capable to
oﬀer ‘unprecedented opportunities for data-driven dis-
covery and decision-making in virtually every area of
human endeavor’ (US National Science Foundation,
2015: 4). In the literature, the main focus of the
debate is on the nature of these opportunities and the
way they can be achieved. According to Mayer-
Scho¨nberger and Cukier (2013), these opportunities
are due to the incredible amount and variety of data,
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which allows us to ﬁnd an equally incredible amount of
meaningful correlations and, on the basis of them,
make sound predictions. For Mayer-Scho¨nberger and
Cukier this implies that, while normally we would have
had to design a hypothesis ﬁrst and then test it against a
dataset, data is now so big and comprehensive that we
can work with correlations only and use them to make
predictions; theoretical elements like hypotheses or the-
ories are not necessary. Moreover, the value and abun-
dance of correlations in Big Data entail that there is no
need to study the causal relations between the corre-
lated variables; causal knowledge is not necessary, nei-
ther as a guidance for nor as an output of research.
Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier’s data-driven view
can be synthesised in two elements, which I will now
label for use throughout the article: (i) Big Data allows
for predictions and discoveries free of theoretical elem-
ents; (ii) correlations found in the data are enough and
causal knowledge is not necessary for the exploitation
of Big Data. However powerful and fascinating, the
idea that Big Data can make science data-driven has
been quite criticised in the literature. Kitchin (2014b:
3–5) highlights how crucial elements in Big Data
research, such as methodological choices are neglected
by the data-driven view. Kitchin argues that large data-
sets, although aimed at capturing entire domains, are
still samples requiring methodological considerations to
be correctly picked. Methodology, according to
Kitchin, is also important after the stage of data collec-
tion, as statements based on Big Data are not universal
and independent of their context. From a similar per-
spective, boyd and Crawford (2012) argue that data
analysis always requires methodological choices and is
‘most eﬀective when researchers take account of the
complex methodological processes that underlie’ it
(boyd and Crawford, 2012: 668). Critiques can also
be found in the philosophical literature. Floridi (2014)
argues that exploiting the value of Big Data is not as
simple as many suggest: the value of Big Data lies in the
possibility of ﬁnding ‘small patterns’, but these require
signiﬁcant theoretical engagement and the design of the
‘right questions’ about what we want to collect, look
for, infer, etc. A practical instance of this theoretical
engagement can be seen in the work of the philosopher
of science Leonelli on scientists’ practices of data cur-
ation. Leonelli shows how curation is necessary to
exploit the scientiﬁc value of Big Data and consists in
a signiﬁcant number of activities requiring explicit and
tacit knowledge (Leonelli, 2014b: 404–411). Data-
driven claims on causality have been criticised as well,
especially in the social sciences literature. For instance,
Titiunik (2015) focuses on causal inference in political
science, arguing that correlations in Big Data are no
substitute to causal knowledge, which is always
required in order to make valid causal inferences
(for a review of recent discussions in the ﬁeld, see
Clark and Golder, 2015). This is a good starting
point, but I think that more work needs to be done
concerning how exactly Big Data can be used for
causal inference and whether this is generally possible
in the sciences. As for biomedical sciences in particular,
while philosophers have vastly argued that causal and
mechanist knowledge plays a crucial epistemological
role (see e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005), it is not
clear whether this is still the case in Big Data science. At
the same time, whilst authors such as Leonelli (2014a:
2–3, 8) and Kitchin (2014a: 135) mention causal know-
ledge as one of the major issues of Big Data, they do
not discuss it in detail and do not analyse case studies
directly related to it. Therefore, I think that there are
important questions to answer regarding causal know-
ledge in Big Data science and this is what I will focus on
in this paper, investigating EXPOsOMICS from the
perspective of what I have deﬁned as the second elem-
ent of the data-driven view.
The meet-in-the-middle approach,
complexity and causality
EXPOsOMICS is a Big Data project where scientists
look for associated biomarkers, capable of tracing
exposure and disease. The proponent of the data-
driven view may say that this project is the perfect
example showing how Big Data research consists in
gathering large amounts of data, analysing it, looking
for correlations between biomarkers of exposure and
biomarkers of disease and making predictions. This
would show how correlations are enough and there is
no need for causal knowledge. In order to assess these
claims, I will now look at the methodology of the pro-
ject, as used in speciﬁc studies and explained in a
number of articles. As a way to make the argument
more precise, I shall mainly refer to the aforementioned
study of breast and colon cancer carried out by
Chadeau-Hyam et al. (2011), which clearly shows the
main features of researchers’ methodology. In this case
the ﬁrst step consisted in looking for associations in the
data to produce lists of putative associated markers of
exposure and disease (Chadeau-Hyam et al., 2011: 85).
According to the data-driven view, researchers should
have stopped at this analysis of data and associations;
however, associations were used only as a starting point
and – I argue – as a way of studying disease causation.
That is, in EXPOsOMICS, when a correlation between
biomarkers is identiﬁed as statistically signiﬁcant, sci-
entists apply what they call the ‘meet-in-the-middle
approach’ in order to look for intermediate biomarkers
between the ones of exposure and disease, i.e. what lies
‘in the middle’ of correlations. In the breast and colon
cancer case, the application of the meet-in-the-middle
4 Big Data & Society
by guest on September 23, 2016Downloaded from 
approach consisted in the comparison between two lists
of associated makers and, then, the search for a third
biomarker at the intersection between the two (Chadeau-
Hyam et al., 2011: 85–86). As made clear by researchers’
words, this search for intermediate biomarkers is consid-
ered a way of investigating disease causation. Chadeau-
Hyam et al. deﬁne intermediate biomarkers as ‘causal
links between exposures and disease’ (2011: 84; emphasis
added). Assi et al. deﬁne the meet-in-the-middle
approach as way ‘to unravel utmost important steps in
the aetiology of disease’ (2015: 752; emphasis added).
When introducing the approach in 2007, Vineis and
Perera characterised the use of the term intermediate
biomarker ‘in a very broad sense to encompass all meas-
urable markers (in body ﬂuids or in cells) that lie within
the putative causal pathway linking an exposure to the
onset of disease’ (2007: 1959; emphasis added). Vineis
also highlights that the inspiration for the approach
was Salmon’s (1984) characterisation of causal processes
in terms of mark transmission.1
Hence, in contrast with the data-driven view,
researchers working with Big Data in EXPOsOMICS
do not think that correlations are enough and have
designed a speciﬁc methodological approach for the
investigation of causal links. But why do they think
that studying causality is necessary? I will argue that
this is precisely because correlations are not enough,
since they are aﬀected by a number of issues and need
to be ‘validated’. That is, as Vineis and Perera explain,
it is necessary to understand whether the relation
between associated elements is a causal one or is only
a consequence of e.g. side eﬀects or confounding (2007:
1961). In other words, scientists study disease causation
as a way to handle issues aﬀecting correlations in big
datasets, which in turn are due to two diﬀerent kinds of
complexity. A ﬁrst kind of complexity aﬀects the data
itself: the volume of data is so large that it comprises
thousands of variables; consequently, when scientists
analyse the dataset looking for correlations, the prob-
lem is not ﬁnding correlations but rather ﬁnding too
many of them. Additionally, a second kind of complex-
ity aﬀects the target systems studied by scientists. As
Vineis explains, this is quite evident in the case of
cancer, for which we do not know a necessary cause
and, probably, single instances of cancer are linked to a
variety of (both strong and weak) exposures. Therefore,
scientists cannot focus on just one variable in their
datasets or a correlation between variables, but need
to study a variety of them. At the same time, though,
the complexity of the target systems also implies that
the variables in the datasets interact in non-simple
ways: for one, variables are not only correlated with
their causes, but also with their eﬀects, the other eﬀects
of its causes, etc. For example, scientists may ﬁnd cor-
relations between biomarkers tracing, say, high levels of
glucose and biomarkers signalling the development of
breast and colon cancer. The problem is that, at this
stage of research, scientists may not be able to tell if the
data about levels of glucose increases their knowledge
of cancer development or can be used to suggest policy,
because it might be an eﬀect of cancer or both the high
level of glucose and cancer might be caused by some-
thing else. Consequently, in this situation scientists
need to be sure that none of these issues is in place,
i.e. they need to validate the association between glu-
cose and cancer; this, we have seen, is done through the
meet-in-the-middle approach and the search for an
intermediate causal link. Practically, in the breast and
colon cancer case, Chadeau-Hyam et al. ran diﬀerent
statistical tests on the lists of associated makers and
ditched possibly positive results as a consequence of
considerations regarding statistics, previous experi-
ments, disease mechanisms and causation. For
instance, the ranking of signiﬁcance was found consist-
ent between limited and larger samples, but this was
seen as possibly leading to ‘uncontrolled confounding
for the matching variables’ (Chadeau-Hyam et al.,
2011: 86). Moreover, researchers relied on existing
causal knowledge on disease mechanism, through for
instance the Human Metabolome Database, which
gathers qualitative descriptions, labels, visualisations,
etc. on metabolomic mechanisms (Wishart et al.,
2007). Thanks to this combination of data, theoretical
and methodological considerations and existing causal
knowledge, they studied the causal links between expos-
ure and disease, identifying the dietary intake of ﬁbres
as a probable intermediate biomarker (Chadeau-Hyam
et al., 2011: 86).
Formal causal models and the crucial
role of knowledge in
In the previous section, I have focused on the methodo-
logical novelty designed in EXPOsOMICS, the meet-
in-the-middle approach, arguing that researchers use it
to study disease causation and solve correlations’
issues. The approach shows how, in contrast with
data-driven claims, causality is necessary for the Big
Data research of EXPOsOMICS. Yet, in spite
of these points, the proponent of the data-driven view
may point out that certain analytical tools, like formal
causal models, make it possible to ‘extract’ causality
from datasets, without strong theoretical consider-
ations and in a signiﬁcant data-driven way.2 Formal
causal models are quantitative tools, which apply a
statistical interpretation to the data in order to study
the causal relations of a target system. They are com-
posed of two elements: a number of variables, which
describe the causal structure of the system and may be
displayed in terms of tables, directed graphs
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or structural equations; a probability distribution
attached to each variable (as synthesised by
Hitchcock, 2009: 300–301). When studying a system,
two are the main scopes of formal causal models (as
summarised by Illari and Russo, 2014: 62–64). They
can be used either to model the causal relations in
order to make predictions, if something is known
about the causal relations of the system, or to model
phenomena in order to get information and make dis-
coveries about causal relations, if these are unknown.
Considering these features and their use in big datasets
(Illari and Russo, 2014: 60–61), formal causal models
may be considered the way to go in EXPOsOMICS.
For instance, in the case of breast and colon cancer,
researchers may describe the causal relations by listing
a number of variables (features of diet and lifestyle,
such as smoking, levels of sugar, cholesterol, etc. and
elements of the metabolic system, like levels of glucose,
creatinine, lipids, etc.) and, on the basis of data ana-
lysis, assigning probabilities to the variables.3 In this
way, scientists may be able to make predictions. If,
say, a certain level of cholesterol is observed, scientists
may substitute this value for the variable within the
system, resolve the equations and obtain a predicted
level of, for instance, glucose. In principle, this would
avoid one of the kinds of complexity we have seen in
the previous section: the simpliﬁcation of datasets
through equations would reduce their dimension and
allow researchers to focus on just a few variables,
thus avoiding complexity due to the volume of data.
In turn, proponents of data-driven claims may say
that the use of formal causal models warrants a
weaker version of their view: while scientists may ﬁnd
causality necessary for their research, the idea would be
that they could study it on the basis of data only and
without relying on existing causal knowledge or strong
theoretical considerations.
However, while researchers in EXPOsOMICS do
assign probability distributions to their variables and
use various statistical models, they do not use formal
causal models. Again, the problem here is complexity,
speciﬁcally the kind of complexity aﬀecting target sys-
tems, which leads to huge gaps between the systems and
formal causal models. That is, while the representation
of a system might be approximated so that formal
causal models can be used, approximations would
leave out too many of the system’s important aspects.
For example, consider the causal Markov condition,
one of the conditions formal causal models need to
meet. It states that, for each variable V of the system,
the direct causes of V screen oﬀ V from anything but
the direct eﬀects of V: that is, the probability of V only
depends on its direct causes and is independent of any-
thing else except its eﬀects (see Hitchcock, 2009:
306–308; Illari and Russo, 2014: 68–69). The condition
is quite problematic for the target systems studied in
EXPOsOMICS, because important causes may not be
direct or it may be diﬃcult to understand which causes
are direct. That is, often scientists do not know enough
about the target system to apply the causal Markov
condition and approximating the representation of the
system so that the condition can be applied to the
model may make it radically diﬀerent and spurious.4
Because of complexity, thus, the minimal theoretical
engagement and the arguably data-driven nature of
formal causal models are not enough. Researchers
need to use other statistical tools, which I will argue
are based on an extensive use of diﬀerent theoretical
elements, including causal knowledge. The importance
of these methodological elements and the role played by
causal knowledge are highlighted by scientists in a sig-
niﬁcant number of articles dedicated to introducing the
diﬀerent statistical models used in the project. For
instance, in the case of breast and colon cancer,
researchers assigned a probability distribution to the
variables of the system, but then used a ‘multivariate’
statistical approach called O-PLS (Chadeau-Hyam
et al., 2011: 85). Multivariate approaches work with
data obtained through multiple measurements and
sources by ﬁnding a reduced number of principal vari-
ables – called Principal Components, PCs – in the data.
That is, O-PLS and other multivariate approaches do
not work on the whole structure of the datasets, but
aim at ﬁnding the PCs which are capable of ‘reducing’
the large datasets of EXPOsOMICS into structures.
Signiﬁcantly, PCs are identiﬁed thanks to consider-
ations about statistical performance and disease mech-
anisms (see Trygg and Wold, 2002). In addition to
multivariate models, the complexity of both the target
systems and big datasets of EXPOsOMICS require the
use of other models. There are cases where the reduc-
tion to few PCs is not useful, because these may not
reﬂect the whole data in its diversity or the studied phe-
nomenon may not work as a consequence of a few
independent variables (Chadeau-Hyam et al., 2013:
548–549). Consequently, researchers also use variable
selection models, which allow them to directly select a
speciﬁc subset of variables and predictors, so that their
performance as estimators is improved (the selection
works as a penalised regression). Again, variables are
selected relying on existing knowledge about the causal
nature and the statistical features of the estimator (see a
technical overview of these selection methods in Yuan
and Lin, 2006). Another type of model used in
EXPOsOMICS is the univariate one (Chadeau-Hyam
et al., 2013: 544–546). This works separately on data,
by associating a predictor (e.g. omics measurement)
with outcomes of interest (e.g. presence/absence of
disease) and tends to use linear models, as a result of
the continuous nature of most omics measurement
6 Big Data & Society
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(having the form of e.g. levels of cholesterol, percent-
ages of metabolomic developments, etc.). Univariate
models are very useful because they are computation-
ally eﬃcient, ﬂexible in accommodating diﬀerent types
of data and available in most statistical software.
Considerations regarding the data and use of causal
knowledge are crucial in this case too, since, especially
in the more complex situations, it is necessary to make
hypotheses about the nature of the causal relation
between variables, predictor and outcome.
Hence, we have seen that the study of causality by
scientists in EXPOsOMICS cannot consist in extracting
causality from the data with a minimal engagement
with theoretical and methodological considerations.
In contrast with the data-driven view, scientists con-
sider causality a crucial element of their Big Data
research and carry out this research relying on existing
causal knowledge. I would deﬁne this use of causal
knowledge in terms of knowledge in, meaning what
researchers have to ‘put in’ their routine in order to
handle complexity issues, study the causal links
between exposure and disease and exploit the value of
their big datasets. This use of existing causal knowledge
is in line with signiﬁcant work in the literature on causal
discovery in the sciences, especially with the idea of ‘no
causes in, no causes out’ developed by the philosopher
Cartwright. According to her, when trying to scientif-
ically investigate the causality of phenomena, ‘old
causal knowledge must be supplied for new causal
knowledge to be had’ (Cartwright, 1989: 39). Having
seen how old causal knowledge is supplied in
EXPOsOMICS, I will now turn to what it means to
have new causal knowledge as a goal of the project.
EXPOsOMICS goals and knowledge out
In the previous sections we have seen how researchers
working with Big Data in EXPOsOMICS think that
correlations are not enough and they need to study
causality, on the basis of theoretical considerations
and existing causal knowledge. Now, I will show that
studying causality in EXPOsOMICS is necessary not
only to validate the associated biomarkers of big data-
sets, but also to try and meet the project’s goals: if sci-
entists only worked with correlations and did not study
causality, they would unlikely meet these aims. Let me
go back to the previous example of glucose, for which I
imagined that scientists found associations between
biomarkers tracing levels of glucose and biomarkers
signalling the development of breast and colon
cancer. In such a situation, the level of glucose may
be a good predictor of cancer even if it is not causally
linked with the disease, as for instance it may have a
causal relation with another element which is, in turn
and separately, linked with cancer. Therefore, one may
say that correlations are enough. However, we should
remember that one of the main goals EXPOsOMICS is
informing policy interventions. For this sort of goals,
correlations are not enough: it is crucial to understand
whether the correlated items are also causally linked or
not; if they are not, policies and interventions may be
useless. Consider again the glucose example: on the
basis of correlations only, scientists would unlikely sug-
gest policies regarding, say, the presence of glucose in
diets. The problem here is that correlations alone will
not tell scientists whether e.g. levels of glucose are
linked with eﬀects or causes of cancer, which is funda-
mental for interventions. That is, if certain levels of
glucose are linked with eﬀects of cancer, intervening
on them will not yield positive results; on the other
hand, if they are linked with causes of cancer, imple-
menting policies on glucose may change the presence or
evolution of the disease. For these goals, therefore,
studying the causal path between exposure and disease
is necessary and the search for intermediate biomarkers
is precisely aimed at that, since intermediate bio-
markers are either indicators of the causal path or
causal links themselves.
Hence, in EXPOsOMICS scientists do not simply
extract correlations or causality from the data, but,
thanks to theoretical, statistical and methodological
considerations, explicitly intend to add new causal
knowledge to the existing literature in order to meet
the goals of the project. In other words, researchers
aim at producing new casual knowledge on the basis
of Big Data research. Such a production of causal
knowledge can be seen as an instance of knowledge
out, i.e. the output of scientists’ activities, potentially
capable of having an impact on external situations
like public health and policy-making. Therefore, for
the EXPOsOMICS case causal knowledge plays a cru-
cial and necessary role, both ‘in’, as one of the sources
of research, and ‘out’, as one of the outcomes of the
project. This fundamentally undermines what I have
labelled as one of the main claims of the data-driven
view (ii), according to which correlations found
through Big Data analysis are enough and causal
knowledge is redundant. In contrast with these
claims, evidence from EXPOsOMICS suggests that
causal knowledge should be considered a legitimate
and necessary element of Big Data research.
The role of theoretical considerations
in EXPOsOMICS
In the previous sections, as the main focus of the article,
I have argued that causal knowledge is necessary for the
Big Data research of EXPOsOMICS. Before focusing
on the methodology of the project, I have distinguished
two main claims composing the data-driven view,
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i.e. the ideas of research free of theoretical elements (i)
and causal knowledge (ii). As I have already said, the
ﬁrst element of the data-driven view has been widely
examined in the literature. Now, I would like to connect
the case study research of the article to this literature by
looking at (i) from the perspective of EXPOsOMICS.
For this purpose, I will emphasise again the role of
theoretical, methodological and statistical consider-
ations, which – as we have seen – play a fundamental
role in scientists’ research, one without which research
would not be possible. For instance, the colon and
breast cancer case was shaped by researchers’ methodo-
logical considerations, like the decision to use the multi-
variate statistical model. This echoes boyd and
Crawford (2012) and Kitchin’s (2014b) critiques of (i),
which emphasise the importance of hypotheses, sam-
pling and methodology. In particular, the following
statement by boyd and Crawford may be seen as a
quite appropriate characterisation of EXPOsOMICS:
‘data analysis is most eﬀective when researchers take
account of the complex methodological processes that
underlie the analysis of that data’ (boyd and Crawford,
2012: 668). Another stage of research where the litera-
ture has signiﬁcantly highlighted the role of theoretical
elements is data curation, which is the set of activities
surrounding the management, organisation, storage,
sharing, etc. of datasets and has become a fundamental
aspect of research in diﬀerent parts of the life sciences
(see e.g. Leonelli and Ankeny, 2012). The idea is that, if
data is not stored in a continuously maintained access-
ible database, if it is not easily searchable, if it is not
properly labelled (Boem, 2016), i.e. if it is not curated,
not much can be done with it; since curation is also
based on theoretical elements, Big Data research
cannot be considered theory-free (Leonelli, 2013).
This can also be seen in the practices of
EXPOsOMICS. When researchers collect data, for
instance analysing blood samples through mass spec-
trometry, they carry out what Vineis calls ‘pre-proces-
sing practices’, mainly consisting in removing
impossible results and nuisances (data cleaning) or
selecting the elements which are most relevant to the
study (data selection). Vineis highlights how these are
grounded in scientists’ knowledge: results are cleaned as
a consequence of considerations about biological
plausibility and are selected depending on the sort of
study researchers are carrying out (for instance,
researchers may discard water-related associations
because the study focuses on air-related ones).
Therefore, EXPOsOMICS is signiﬁcantly based on
knowledge and theoretical elements. As a consequence,
I would argue that these features of EXPOsOMICS are
in line with critiques of (i) expressed in the literature. In
addition to this, I would also say that the EXPOsOMICS
case can give interesting suggestions on alternative
ways of framing the role of theoretical elements in
Big Data research: indeed, while these signiﬁcantly
shape research, it is not really correct to say that they
‘come ﬁrst’ and drive research. For example, in the
breast and colon cancer case, research started with
data from the European Prospective Investigation
into Cancer and Nutrition,5 which had not been per-
sonally collected and curated within EXPOsOMICS.
Theoretical considerations were carried out in subse-
quent steps, like when scientists chose the multivariate
statistical model, applied the meet-in-the-middle
approach, used mechanist knowledge about the disease,
etc. Hence, sometimes it may be that scientists begin
with the data and do not apply strong a priori hypoth-
eses, theories or models; yet, theoretical elements need
to be used subsequently. In other cases, however, the-
oretical elements may need to be used a priori, for
instance when scientists rely on knowledge in, choose
to focus on the collection of data regarding speciﬁc
elements of the target system and accordingly carry
out data cleaning. Hence, while theoretical elements
do not always drive research, saying that data always
drives the project would not be accurate either.
Consequently, the EXPOsOMICS case suggests that
we should abandon accounts of Big Data science
according to which there is a strict relationship between
theoretical considerations and data, so that either the-
oretical considerations or data drive research. In con-
trast with both theory- and data-driven views, in
EXPOsOMICS data and theoretical aspects are mutu-
ally inﬂuencing elements: as in a loop, research may
start with and come back to data and theoretical elem-
ents more than once. For example, in the breast and
colon cancer case researchers did start with the data,
but then at the more theoretical level used the meet-in-
the-middle approach, again there was an analysis of the
data for the intermediate biomarkers, then results were
compared with the literature and existing causal know-
ledge, etc. The value of these suggestions drawn from
EXPOsOMICS can be seen in the comparison with
other accounts of Big Data science proposed in the lit-
erature. Kitchin (2014b: 5–7) argues that Big Data
research starts oﬀ with an initial exploration, used to
ﬁnd and generate new hypotheses ‘born from the data’;
such an exploration is guided by theoretical elements like
existing knowledge. This view correctly highlights the
crucial role played by theoretical considerations, but it
may still seem that data always drives research; on the
other hand, we have seen that in EXPOsOMICS scien-
tists often begin with hypotheses which are not born
from the data. Ratti (2015) distinguishes between Big
Data projects based on a hybrid data- and hypothesis-
driven approach and ‘data mining studies’ like
EXPOsOMICS, where ‘researchers look for robust
regularities in metadata associations’ (Ratti, 2015:
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210). Ratti argues that in data mining studies the elim-
ination of putative results depends only on the robust-
ness of regularities found in the data and the overall
goal is obtaining predictions or generalisations,
not discovering mechanisms. I would say that
EXPOsOMICS (if considered a data mining study)
shows that things are diﬀerent. In the breast and
colon cancer case, scientists removed the results of
the putative lists of biomarkers on the basis of statis-
tical as well as theoretical considerations; moreover,
data and correlations were used to understand disease
causation and the mechanistic link between bio-
markers (as also argued by Illari and Russo, 2013:
187–188).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown the ﬂaws of the data-
driven account of Big Data science. Focusing on
EXPOsOMICS, I have highlighted how researchers
study causality as a consequence of correlations’
issues and diﬀerent kinds of complexity. I have
shown that causal knowledge is a necessary element
of the project, both as a source to shape research
(knowledge in) and as an output to meet its goals
(knowledge out). I have consequently concluded that
data-driven claims about the redundancy of causal
knowledge are ﬂawed and causal knowledge should
be considered a necessary element of Big Data science.
Besides, I have argued that the EXPOsOMICS case is
also relevant to the discussion on theoretical elements,
insofar as in the project it is not that either data or
theoretical elements strictly drive research, but rather
both of them play a crucial role and mutually inﬂuence
each other.
Considering the results of the paper, one may ques-
tion their generality and applicability, arguing that
EXPOsOMICS is a special case with radically diﬀerent
features from most of Big Data science. While more
research needs to be done on these points, I think
that the aspects of EXPOsOMICS which undermine
the data-driven view – the signiﬁcant presence of com-
plexity and goals of suggesting policy – exist in many
other Big Data projects. As for the level and kinds of
complexity, these – especially the complexity of target
systems – of course vary in each case, but the kind of
complexity and the consequent correlations’ issues due
to the volume of Big Data are typical of most Big Data
research (as also argued by Illari and Russo, 2013:
183). Moreover, we should not think that complexity
regards scientiﬁc projects only, as it also aﬀects the
economic and social environment where Big Data is
considered to potentially have a great impact.6 As for
policy suggestions, the use of Big Data for this is not
exclusive to EXPOsOMICS: actually, one of the
contexts where Big Data is often considered capable
of making a diﬀerence is precisely policy-making.7
Therefore, while other Big Data projects may be sub-
stantially diﬀerent from EXPOsOMICS when it comes
to research areas, methodology, novelty, etc. the rea-
sons why correlations are not enough and causal know-
ledge is necessary for Big Data research may still be
present. These results about causal knowledge are not
to be seen only as critiques of the data-driven view:
rather, on the positive side, they suggest that other
projects may beneﬁt from a stronger consideration of
causal knowledge. In addition, new questions on the
role of causal knowledge arise. For instance, it remains
unclear how Big Data research may change as a con-
sequence of a stronger consideration of causal know-
ledge and whether the production of causal knowledge
is always possible or limited by the features of speciﬁc
projects. Moreover, since we have seen that causal
knowledge is necessary for policy interventions,
another important issue regards the consequences on
privacy and ethics, i.e. questions concerning whether
causal knowledge requires that we know more and at
a more speciﬁc level. Thus, the results of this article
indicate the need for further research and raise new
questions about the appropriate framing of Big Data
science. Indeed, studying the way we frame Big Data
research is decisive, as improving our use of Big Data
also depends on what we think it can do and what kind
of data-driven, methodologically engaged, causality-
free, etc. ideas we associate with it.
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Notes
1. By reporting Vineis’ words, I want to highlight that
researchers in EXPOsOMICS explicitly aim at investigat-
ing causality as a crucial part of their research and I do not
intend to endorse Salmon’s view as an account of causality
in EXPOsOMICS. My aim in this paper is not arguing
that EXPOsOMICS suggests a specific account of causal-
ity, but rather that it shows how causal knowledge is neces-
sary for Big Data science. However, one may say that
I need to specify what I mean by causality and the account
I commit to. The focus on links, mechanisms and the ref-
erence to Salmon suggest that a production approach to
causality may be the right account of causality in bio-
markers research. Indeed, Illari and Russo (2013) draw
on this tradition in order to develop their informational
account of the causal links scientists look for in
EXPOsOMICS. As the references I use throughout the
article suggest, I find this account quite promising and
capable of correctly depicting the approach of the project
(see also Russo and Vineis, forthcoming). Yet, I also think
that defending Illari and Russo’s account is beyond the
scope of this paper and investigating its validity in Big
Data science more generally needs further research, as
for instance Pietsch (2016: 147–148) has argued that
causal modelling in Big Data is based on the difference-
making account of causation.
2. For formal causal models I refer to Pearl (2000), whose use
of structural equations generalises causal Bayesian
Networks. For an introduction to the literature on
formal causal models, see Illari and Russo (2014: 60–85).
3. Here, I apply Hitchcock’s (2009: 302) characterisation of
formal causal models to a disease example.
4. The issue of not having enough knowledge is also high-
lighted by Hausman and Woodward (1999: 580).
5. For an introduction to the project and data collection
practices, see Riboli et al. (2002).
6. See Mitchell (2009) for a summary of complexity in differ-
ent contexts, including economy and policy-making.
7. See e.g. the goals and vision of the Alan Turing Institute
for Data Science, launched in November 2015: ‘inform
scientific and technological discoveries, create new
business opportunities, accelerate solutions to global chal-
lenges, inform policy-making, and improve the environ-
ment, health and infrastructure’ (2015).
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